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Preamble
ProcessPhilosophyto ProcessBuddhism
PurushottamaBilimoria
LIKE Robert Neville, I too have great pleasure in writing my
own endorsement to the posthumous publication of Peter
Kakol's wonderful book. Peter Kakol studied philosophy with
my erstwhile colleague, Dr Peter Fenner, and myself at Deakin
University in the mid-1990s. Both of us were also supervisors
for his Ph.D. thesis, which he completed, much on his own
bat, while I was mostly overseas. So I did not have the privilege
of interacting with Kakol on his more developed and
sophisticated study and writings on Buddhism and Process·
Philosophy. However, I did get to hear a couple of his
presentations at an Asian and Comparative Philosophy
Conference and at our school seminar. I was most impressed.
Upon my return from Emory University in Atlanta around
mid-2000, Peter (as we all called him) visited me in my office
in Geelong quite regularly; he was writing a chapter or two
for a study text for us and served as a tutor for a couple of
undergraduate courses as well. One day he told me that he
was suffering from severe pain in one of his shoulders and
that the pain would descend down to the entire side of his
body. The Polish family physician he was consulting did not
think it was anything very serious and prescribed for him
some pain-killing tablets. About a month or so later I received
a phone call from him in the local hospital to tell me that he
was undergoing some intensive surgery and that he would
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be all right. It seemed like it was a routine appendicitis problem
which some young men often encounter once in their lifetime.
In the next phone call, he had just come out of surgery and
fourteen gall-bladder stones had been removed. This was
alarming, and had I not been leaving for an overseas conference
I would have visited him; but he needed the quiet time to
recover. Time passed and I overlooked to check on Peter as
he was shuffled between specialist hospitals in Melbourne and
Geelong; given also that I was tending to my wife who had
returned from India some months back and was not herself in
the best of health. While we were recuperating in our retreat
in Venus Bay (I from an excessive bout of jetsetter's dislocation)
two days after New Year of 2002, I received a phone call from
Peter's brother, Richard, to break the most heart-breaking
news that Peter had passed away a few days earlier. The gall-
stones were just a side-symptom of a pernicious cancer that
had all but destroyed his liver and proved to be fatal all within
a short span of some three months since the inception of the
initial complaint about the inexplicable shoulder pain. I was
shocked and sorrowed, to say the least.
Ever since then I have been keen to see Peter's thesis
reworked into a book form and published. I did not have a
copy. Peter's brother Richard could retrieve an electronic copy
from Peter's abandoned computer. That took some challenges
of its own. At a belated memorial service organized in the
University to remember Peter among his family, friends and
university associates, I promised to find a publisher for his
manuscript. Events of a tragic kind overtook my life and I
had to place this project on hold. In the last-year or so I gained
some momentum with my former commitments and proceeded
to solicit prospective publishers; I am delighted that DK
Printworld have undertaken to publish the work. I am grateful
to Richard and the Kakol family for their patience with my
tardy progress in this matter; and I thank Dr Ian Weeks, one
of Peter's ardent admirers and readers of his thesis manuscript,
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"wholly other," transcending the process of events. If there is
a God, it must itself be an inclusively transcending series of
events, each viewing reality from the perspective of the
universe itself rather than being a "view from nowhere." That
is to say, God's relation to the universe would be analogous
to the relation between mind and body, which is itself a
relation between an event and an organized grouping of
events. I t is a more inclusive view in which conceptual
contrasts, such as polarities of being and becoming, cause and
effect, absolute and relative, are each inclusive of the other;
there is no being without becoming, and necessarily vice versa
(in other words, the absolute cannot simply assimilate and
thus annihilate the relative or the non-absolute - a mistake
that Hegel made even as he began with very basic process
insights, and one that Leibniz had rightly resisted). Change is
a contingent factor and it might occur at different rates in
different worlds or realms. The whole is a sum of ever-
changing conjunction of necessary and contingent parts. This
is better expressed in terms of the relation of "dependency"
rather than inclusiveness, much less "all-inclusiveness."
Peter Kakol has articulated this insight with an axiom
elsewhere in his papers, which I would like to quote:
It is a basic insight of process thought that dependent on is
not the same as included in - rather, the dependent is
inclusive and the independent is the included.
Interestingly enough, process thought goes one step further
and asserts that events are themselves perspectives or "views"
of their past, which they express or IIfeel."In the end there is
nothing but views of views, or feelings of feelings, iterated
recursively. So every event is a view that synthesizes past
events in a unique perspective; but since there is more than
one perspective, there is an element of creativity in all events.
And just as the event is a creative synthesis of events, so the
view is a creative synthesis of views.
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But what does process philosophy have to do with
Buddhism? Well, this is the remarkable foray that Peter makes
into this emergent field w!thin comparative philosophy.
Readers will have to painstakingly plod through the pages of
this book to appreciate how carefully and meticulously Peter
effects this comparison. Peter draws from Madhyamika more
than from any of the other schools of Buddhist thought. I will
take the liberty of citing without marks passages that I had
earlier edited for Peter. The Madhyamikas believe that the
concepts we use to characterize reality, although conventionally
valid, reduce to absurdity when subjected to logical analysis.
The reason for this is that all views, when analyzed, imply
their own negation, which means that they are logically
dependent on opposing" views that contradict them. The
consequence of this is that all views are ultimately empty of
independent existence (svabhava)- that is, they depend on
other views for -their existence and thus cannot stand alone.
To this basic observation (based on introspective awareness)
that all views are empty, the Madhyamikas add that even this
observation itself - if put forth as a view itself - is also
empty. This teaching, which is born out of a desire to be
logically consistent, is called the "emptiness of emptiness."
The basic procedure of the Madhyamikas is to subject all
views to "bi-negation." That is, views are negated by the use
of reductioad absurdumarguments (or sometimes, provisionally
valid syllogisms), and then opposing views that arise by this
negation are themselves negated in the same way. This is
usually sufficient for liberation. However, the tetralemma
(sometimes even the hexalemma) is often used in order to
avert misunderstanding. The first two lemmas correspond to
the (above stated) two negations of bi-negations. The third
lemma is that the view that is formed from the conjunction of
the two views that have absurd consequences is itself absurd.
The fourth lemma is the postulation of the bi-negation as itself
a view in its own right. It is invalid"because there can be no
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third view between two contradictory views and because it is
logically identical with the third lemma (as P and -P is the
same as -P & -(-P)). This process can continue indefinitely -
for instance, one can always form a new view that is a
conjunction of the third and fourth lemmas, and so on; but
the whole point of the Madhyamika analysis is to arrest this
process. Two observations arise from this discussion: fir·st,
the basic Madhyamika procedure of bi-negation is not reducible
to the fourth lemma" for it is not a view, and second, the
Ma.dhyamika affirm neither the coincidence of opposites
nor a hyperessential absolute beyond
oppositional dualities.
The bi-negation principally used to demonstrate the
emptiness of four kinds of views: views about phenomena,
(such as causes, objects, things and so on), views about the
self (particularly its relation to the mind-body aggregate),
views on the relation between phenomena and self (including
dependent origination), and views about ultimate things (such
as emptiness, nirVii.1Ja,the tathagata and so on)'. In all cases the
question is asked whether we can conceive of the relation
between a concept and its opposite in terms of identity or
difference, and the consequences of either is shown to be
absurd. For example, is the self to be identified with the mind-
body or differentiated from it? But if relation is one of identity
there would be as many selves as there are bodily and mental
parts; and if the relation is one of difference then the self and
the mind-body would be unrelated. The conclusion is that the
self is empty.
It is the book's contention that process and Madhyamika
theories of world-views are not incompatible with one another,
but are rather complementary aspects of the same theory. I
am aware that a number of Madhyamika philosophers amongst
us will fervently reject this claim; some would not entertain
process thought by any· stretch of imagination and others may
not give it the ranking and status they would to analytical
Preamble xvii
and some aspects of hermeneutical philosophy. Nevertheless,
I believe and am confident that the exercise is not fraught and
that some useful insights are forthcoming from such a
comparison, without becoming either too cynical· or too
evangelical about the venture.
Peter notes that the fundamental compatibility between
the process and Madhyamika theories of world-views can be
seen in the fact that both accept that all views become
contradictory if seen as independent and must therefore be
constantly transcended in a process of gradual purification
and de-reification (or nominalization), rather than a process
that continues to perpetuate illusory views. Also, both agree
that there is no such thing as a theory of everything that is
both complete and self-consistent. This is because a theory is
a view which of necessity excludes the viewer. One may try
to include the viewer in a wider view, but then the viewer of
the wider view is excluded. Every view which attempts to
include the viewer without jumping to a higher and more
inclusive view is inconsistent. Hence, every view that claims
to be all-inclusive is either consistent or complete, but not
both. Since no one would want to be inconsistent, it is a
requirement that all views claim to be exhaustive descriptions
of reality. It reduces such views to absurdity by pointing out
that each view is either impossible, or dependent on other
views, and thus not exhaustive after all. Process philosophy,
on the other hand, describes the temporal process as itself a
function of this incompleteness of views: the creative striving
on the part of perspectival entities for both completeness and
consistency of views leads to the never satisfiable procession
of perspectives that transcend and include all previous
perspectives. So Madhyamika and Process philosophies are,
respectively, negative and positive aspects of reality - the
former deconstructs all-inclusive or absolute views, and the
other describes the asymmetrical process of inclusive
transcendence that results from the constant deconstructions
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going on in nature. Both agree that the unsatisfied striving
inherent in this process cannot be resolved by leaping into an
Absolute that transcends the duality of completeness and
inconsistency (or the whole. and the part), but by
understanding why the process is unsatisfactory and
embracing the II creative advance into novelty" that results
from it. '
The theory of world-views that results from the above
discussion is as follows. Diachronically, all world-views are
at the same time wholes including antecedent views and parts
included in subsequent views. Synchronically, views can be
classified as either closed or open and as either negative or
positive. Closed views are complete but inconsistent whereas
open views are consistent but incomplete. Each of these can
take positive or negative forms. Hence, open views are either
positive Process-like views (creative synthesis and inclusive
transcendence) or negative Madhyamika-like views (negative
dialectics and athesis). Likewise, for closed views, the positive
ones affirm a hyperessential absolute. As Peter discusses in
his book, open and closed views can also be called, following
Magliola "differential" and II centric" views respectively; and
Dilworth's distinction between "dialectical" and /I agonistic"
(or IIparadoxicallf)views is similar to the positive and negative
views respectively. Process and Madhyamika views are like
an open non-dual double surface between the closed
dualistic heights and the closed monistic depths. I do not think
that it is possible to use this classification of views to
characterize and differentiate "Western" and "Eastern" world-
views. In my view I these tendencies can be found all over the
world, cutting across all cultures.
In order to deflect the criticism of post-modernists such
as Lyotard that this general theory of world-views is a "grand
narrative," I make the following observations. That there can
be no view of the whole is obvious, because, as stated above,
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there is no whole that is not itself a part of a larger whole.
Hence, a theory of world-views is necessarily incomplete, as
are all world-views. But the theory of world-views is not itself
a world-view. Rather it is a view about world-views, so it is
meant to be incomplete. The theory is "general," but this I!leans
that it is a universal yet partial aspect of (or abstraction from)
the whole, somewhat like a map. Hence, the theory avoids
being totalistic but it also avoids the opposite extreme of
implausibly advocating the grand narrative that grand
narratives are possible.
I invite now the readers to relish and make a critical
evaluation themselves of the very promising though shamefully
short-lived philosophical - and dare I add "philosophic" -
synthesis of a young man amidst us.
Melbourne/New York
